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Abstract 
In recent years, several jurisdictions worldwide have implemented plastic bag regulations to 
curb environmentally deleterious effects of plastic bag production and consumption.  The 
problems that each jurisdiction experience vary from place-to-place; as do the policy 
mechanisms set forth to combat these problems.  Documentation of explicit economic 
rationality regarding these plastic bag regulations is scarce.  This thesis sets out to fill some of 
that void. 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 1 briefly sets forth the goals of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 researches current worldwide plastic bag regulation initiatives. Constituents 
ranging from small towns to large countries, in places ranging from Africa to America to 
Asia, have implemented regulation.  The mechanisms chosen to date are either command and 
control instruments (such as prohibitions) or market based instruments (such as consumer 
taxes).  This chapter discusses how various jurisdictions regulate plastic bags and why they do 
so.   
Chapter 3 examines the economic fundamentals of potential negative externalities arising 
from plastic bag production and consumption. Empirical information is introduced that helps 
to discover why consumption externalities should be policy-makers’ ultimate concern.  The 
most important consumption externality, the littering problem, is then introduced.  Models 
that utilize neoclassical economic actors of the Homo Oeconomicus variety show that littering 
problems can arise due to coordination failure arising from conflicts between social and 
private interests.  The littering problem is shown to display payoff patterns that closely 
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parallel that of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  The potential externalities arising from the 
littering problem include aesthetics, biodiversity loss, and human catastrophe.   
Chapter 4 evaluates in detail alternative regulation strategies to discover if they lead to more 
efficient outcomes.  It is shown that policy justification depends on the behavior of the 
relevant jurisdiction’s marginal benefit and marginal cost functions.  Prohibitions are 
generally inefficient, but the two countries to date that have implemented prohibitions may 
still be justified in doing so.  The concept of Pigouvian taxation is introduced and it is shown 
how a Pigou tax might correct an economy that finds itself at an inefficient equilibrium. The 
final part of Chapter 4 amends the Homo Oeconomicus model by introducing socially 
contingent moral motivation from the Behavioral Economics field.  If consumers have moral 
preferences then moral norms might in certain cases be internalized so as to achieve the 
Pareto optimal result.  One implication is that multiple equilibrium models exist in which 
societies can, at least in theory, move from a “bad” equilibrium to a “good” equilibrium 
where the littering problem disappears.  Taxation and public education programs are policy 
instruments that can stimulate moral motivations.   
Chapter 5 analyzes the plastic bag marketplace in Norway and seeks to apply findings from 
this thesis to the empirical findings regarding that nation.  Norway is a high usage plastic bag 
nation, but the littering problem seems to be virtually non-existent.  Finally, the thesis sets out 
to reconcile and provide possible explanations for why a jurisdiction such as Norway has 
virtually no littering problem whereas other jurisdictions have such extreme littering problems 
that they are compelled to implement regulation policies.   
Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes the results of the thesis. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years the plastic bag has received its fair share of critical backlash.  Several 
jurisdictions worldwide have implemented plastic bag regulations to curb environmentally 
deleterious effects of plastic bag production and consumption.  The problems that each 
jurisdiction experience vary from place-to-place; as do the policy mechanisms set forth to 
combat these problems. 
What are the relevant issues that need to be considered when contemplating the 
implementation of plastic bag policy? Which policy mechanisms have been chosen to date? 
Why, exactly, have these mechanisms been chosen? Are these mechanisms justified from an 
economic standpoint?  Can economic theory teach us how to solve any of these problems? 
At this point in time, Norway has chosen not to implement plastic bag regulations.  But debate 
regarding plastic bag legislation continues.  Environmental sympathizers, political champions, 
popular media, industry representatives, and as I have learned - everyday citizens - have their 
own personal opinions about the issues at hand.  However, Norway has no discernable 
littering problem when compared to nations that have implemented plastic bag policy.  Why 
does the problem seem so small here and so substantial in other places?  Can these differences 
be reconciled using economic theory?  
The general goals of this thesis are as follows.  It seeks to research current worldwide 
regulation initiatives and evaluate the economic underpinnings behind them.  Additionally, 
market failures associated with plastic bag production and consumption will be analyzed in 
order to understand the root of the plastic bag problem.  This thesis seeks to discover which 
policy mechanisms are economically justified.  Potential strategies for implementation are 
thereafter evaluated to show how they can lead to more efficient outcomes.  Furthermore, an 
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analysis of the Norwegian marketplace will be undertaken and explanations for wide 
differences in worldwide littering problems will be suggested.  
3 
 
2 Current Worldwide Plastic Bag 
Regulation Initiatives 
Since the mid 1990’s, the world has witnessed a proliferation of plastic bag regulations.  For 
the most part the mechanisms chosen for implementation in jurisdictions that decide to act can 
be categorized as either command and control (CAC) instruments or market-based 
instruments.   
The predominant fraction of regulation is of the CAC type.  The CAC strategy implies a 
’command’ aspect, which sets a standard, as well as a ’control’ aspect, which monitors and 
enforces the standard.  Essentially a CAC instrument can take the form of quantitative, 
technological, or behavioral restrictions at the firm or consumer level.  The CAC instrument 
can be either performance based or technology based.  If CAC regulation is performance 
based, consumers (producers) are required to consume (produce) at specified quantifiable 
levels so as to attain an environmental goal set forth by authorities.  In practical terms, such 
stipulations take the form of outright plastic bag prohibition.  If CAC regulation is technology 
based, the imposition of qualitative minimum technology requirements can be applied via 
production constraints as well as consumer suppression.  In terms of plastic bag regulation, 
most such stipulations have taken the form of banning thin high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
plastic bags, which differ from low density polyethylene (LDPE) bags in terms of quality.  On 
average, LDPE bags weigh 15 grams whereas HDPE bags weigh 6 grams1
                                                 
1 Environment Australia (2002), p.27. 
.  HDPE bags lack 
robustness and therefore contribute to littering problems more than the LDPE alternative: the 
bags break easily, causing the reuse value to diminish instantaneously, conceivably provoking 
their immediate discarding into the litter stream.  Also, in many countries, consumers 
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travelling longer distances or carrying heavier loads must use two or three HDPE bags at a 
time when one LDPE bag would suffice. 
Market-based instruments operate by providing incentives for firms or consumers to alter 
their behavior on a voluntary basis.  The instruments achieve this by reconfiguring the payoff 
structure that economic agents face.  Economic literature heralds the theoretical effectiveness 
of numerous market-based instruments; taxes, subsidies, and transferable pollution permits 
alike.  To the naked eye, taxes seem to be the only market-based instruments yet to be 
implemented specifically to plastic bags.   
The following section updates the reader on the current plastic bag initiatives that have been 
implemented throughout the world.   For most of these jurisdictions, documentation of 
explicit economic rationality is scarce.  After learning which jurisdictions are doing what, I 
use Chapter 3 to exposit the theoretical economic underpinnings of currently implemented 
instruments to understand why some regulations might be relevant to plastic bag solutions in 
certain circumstances whereas others might not be (any potential regulations discovered to be 
irrelevant will cease to be studied further thereafter). 
2.1 Performance Based Command and Control 
Instruments 
2.1.1 Complete Plastic Bag Prohibitions 
Bangladesh initiated a complete prohibition of polyethylene bag manufacture and distribution 
in the capital city Dhaka in 20022
                                                 
2 SFT (2008), p.14. 
.  The perceived externality was of very serious nature: In 
1998, Bangladesh experienced a flood that covered 60% of the nation, lasted more than two 
weeks, and caused major loss of life.  It was detected after the storm that littered plastic bags 
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had clogged sewage and drainage systems, thereby probably contributing to the causation of 
the catastrophic event3.  In 2002, India implemented a similar ban for similar reasons4.  
India’s plastic bag prohibition raised eyebrows because of its draconian forms of 
punishment5.  Anyone caught using a plastic bag in that country can face imprisonment for up 
to seven years or a fine of 100,000 rupees (~13,500 Norwegian Kroners (NOK)6)7.  Plastic 
bag producers in India are still allowed to produce, so long as the end products are sold 
outside of the nation8.  In a similar vein, Rwanda has effectively abolished the use of plastic 
bags by prohibiting the use of plastic bags under 100 microns thick9.  Some Rwandans, 
however, have accused government militias of using the law to steal goods being carried in 
plastic bags10
In the USA, no all-encompassing federal law has been implemented to reduce plastic bag use.  
However, San Francisco was the first municipal jurisdiction in the USA to ban plastic bags
. 
11.  
The move prohibits the distribution of any plastic bag type and imposes a range of penalties 
for businesses that violate.  Further, the legislation requires that substitutes such as 
compostable plastic bags, recyclable paper and/or reusable bags be offered at point-of-
purchase.  The city of Oakland attempted to enact a similar legislation in 2007, but met strong 
resistance from the Coalition to Support Plastic Bag Recycling, an organization that includes 
plastic bag producers12
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
.  The municipality eventually lost the decisive legal battle because 
4 Ibid, p.15. 
5BBC News, August 7, 2003. Note that this is an electronic source.  A list of electronic resources used in this 
thesis can be found at the end of the literature list. 
6 All currency conversions in this paper measured in August, 2010. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 BBC News, January 17, 2006.  
10 Ibid. 
11 SFT (2008), p.18. 
12 Ibid.  
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they were unable to prove whether a) plastic bags are less environmentally friendly than paper 
bags and b) significant environmental externalities tangibly existed in that case. 
In addition, there are many instances of small municipalities with relevant authority that have 
enacted their own prohibitions; Lord Howe Island in Australia13, Leaf Rapids in Canada14, 
Brighton in England15
  
.  For the most part, these are communities that thrive on tourism and 
seemingly enact such laws to solve perceived littering problems. 
                                                 
13 Environment Australia (2002), p.49. 
14 CBC News, April 2, 2007.  
15 Mail Online, October 19, 2007.  
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2.2 Technology Based Command and Control 
Instruments 
2.2.1 Partial Plastic Bag Prohibitions 
In preparation towards the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China implemented a 
technology based CAC instrument, namely a partial prohibition16.  For fifteen years prior, 
Chinese merchants handed out flimsy HDPE plastic bags for free.  The ensuing litter problem 
became so bad that citizens took to calling the discarded remnants as “white pollution”, in 
reference to the color of most bags found in that country.  The Chinese Cabinet announced a 
two-pronged effort to combat the littering problem.  First, all thin HDPE plastic bags less than 
25 microns were from there on out prohibited.  Second, all supermarkets, department stores, 
and shops were now forbidden from distributing plastic bags of any size free of charge.  In 
2007, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania implemented bans on the use and importation of HDPE 
bags17. Myanmar followed suit at the end of 2009 when they banned the manufacture and 
import of HDPE bags in the former capital city Yangon18
2.3 Market-based Instruments 
. 
2.3.1 Consumer Tax  
Ireland became the first country to invoke a plastic bag tax on consumers when the Waste 
Management Regulations were implemented in 2002.  The levy was applicable to all plastic 
bags (including biodegradable bags) - with the exception of those used to contain fresh 
produce or freshly butchered meats.  The tax was initially set at €0.15 (<2 NOK) and has 
                                                 
16 BBC News, January 9, 2008. 
17 BBC News, June 14, 2007. 
18 Topnews, November 2, 2009. 
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since been adjusted to €0.44 (< 4 NOK).  The main externality was the concern with litter19.  
It was feared that the problem was negatively impacting tourism, the second largest industry 
in Ireland.   Plastic bag use has since diminished by 90% and the levy has proven so popular 
with the Irish public that “it would be politically damaging to remove it”20
South Africa has a salient litter problem attributable to the proliferation of thin HDPE bags
.  The Irish plastic 
bags levy (PlasTax) will be alluded to in later chapters. 
21
Many local municipalities have also implemented consumer taxes.  For example, a tax on 
plastic bags was implemented in Washington, D.C., in January 2010
.  
Initially, South African officials attempted to ban the production and use of bags smaller than 
80 microns.  Outcry among trade officials and industry commenced.  Revamped attempts to 
ban the production and use of bags smaller than 30 microns ensued.  But again, these efforts 
were ultimately stymied.  As a final solution, involved parties eventually agreed on a plastic 
bag tax payable by the consumer to be denoted separately on sales receipts.   
22
  
.  At 5 cents (<1 NOK) 
per bag, the tax is relatively small compared to Ireland’s.  Under regulations created by the 
D.C. Department of the Environment, grocery stores, drugstores, convenience stores, 
department stores and any other "business that sells food items" must charge the tax on paper 
or plastic bags.  The tax has heeded results.  Annual monthly bag usage rates in that city 
shrank from 22.5M plastic bags per month in 2009 to 3.0M bags in the first month of the tax 
strategy.  $150,000 US (~900,000 NOK) was raised in the first month – all of which will be 
used to clean up the local Anacostia River. 
                                                 
19 Environment Australia (2002), p.21. 
20 Convery et al. (2007), p.2,  
21All claims in this paragraph are attributable to  Environment Australia (2002),  p.14. 
22 All claims in this paragraph are attributable to Washington Post, March 30, 2010.  
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2.3.2 Producer Tax  
Denmark also enacted a tax on plastic bags23.  However, this tax differs from the Irish 
PlasTax as it is instead levied on producers.  Denmark imposed a 22 DKK (24 NOK) tax per 
kg on plastic bag producers in 1994.  It is difficult to determine the precise externality that 
Danish officials were attempting to internalize, but it seems that Denmark has set relatively 
ambitious objectives for environmental protection in general.  In particular, it seems that 
Denmark at the time was intent on implementing green taxes, motivated by potential double 
dividends24, a theoretical hypothesis that suggests emission taxes might be able to reduce tax 
distortions in the economy25
                                                 
23 All claims in this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, are attributable to Environment Australia (2002), p.12. 
.  Intuitively this would mean that a tax on plastic bags might 
create, for example, higher employment as well as a better environment.  Although plastic 
bags are still handed out free of any discernable charge to consumers in Denmark, the tax is 
passed along from producers to retailers and ultimately to consumers via increased prices on 
other retail goods.  After introducing the tax, plastic bag consumption has been reduced by 
66%.  It is important to note that this tax is latent to the consumer, which may explain why the 
consumer behavioral effects of the Danish tax have been less dramatic than those of the Irish 
tax. 
24 For a detailed analysis of the Double Dividend hypothesis, see Bovenberg (1999). 
25 Mortensen and Hauch (1991), p.1  
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3 The Fundamentals of Plastic Bag 
Externalities  
According to Meade (1973), “an external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an 
appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not 
fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly 
to the event in question”.   External economies and diseconomies arising out of such actions 
are often referred to as positive externalities and negative externalities, respectively.  
Externalities can lead to market failure.  Welfare economists often follow the maxim that 
externalities are best eliminated, if possible, by setting private property rights that would 
permit trade to take place (Coase, 1960).  However, that strategy does not apply to the plastic 
bags case due to the practical difficulties in assigning private property rights to the 
environment.  When people are not in a position to make voluntary agreements, most 
economists tend to agree that it is the government’s role, if anybody’s, to intervene in order to 
internalize the externality26
Several potential negative externalities appear when analyzing the economic and 
environmental activities associated with the production and consumption of grocery bags in 
general.  However, plastic bags in particular have been a predominant recipient of recent 
negative attention and will therefore be the focal point of this thesis.  
. 
Externalities can also be classified as either production externalities or consumption 
externalities27
                                                 
26 Thaler & Sunstein (2009), p.195. 
.  The research in this thesis has discovered, and will show in the following 
section, that production externalities in the plastic bag case are a problem of general 
production emissions.    The consumption externality in the plastic bag case is predominantly 
27 Perman et al (2003), p.135. 
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a littering problem in terms of post-consumer plastic waste.  The following section explores 
the general theoretical fundamentals of production and consumption externalities along with 
empirical analysis on each. 
3.1 Production Externalities and Production  
A production externality occurs when a firm’s production process causes a decrease in utility 
to an impartial bystanding agent.   If this externality remains unaccounted for then there 
remains cause for concern because inefficiencies in the marketplace exist28
Following and adapting Varian (1992, p.432-444), we can see how an incomplete market can 
lead to negative externalities.  Consider a world comprised of two firms.  Firm 1 produces an 
output level 𝑥 at a cost 𝑐(𝑥) which it sells in a competitive marketplace at an exogenously 
fixed price p.  However, the production of 𝑥 negatively impacts Firm 2’s profits at an 
increasing rate of Firm 1’s output, 𝑒(𝑥).  Here, Firm 2’s profits are implicitly normalized to 
zero.  The profits for Firm 1 and Firm 2 (disregarding other incomes and costs of Firm 2), 
respectively, are 
𝜋1 = max
𝑥
 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐(𝑥) 
𝜋2 = −𝑒(𝑥) 
. 
We assume that 
𝑐′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑐′′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑒′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑒′′(𝑥) > 0  
Which implies that the profit maximizing amount of output for Firm 1,  𝑥1, is 
𝑝 = 𝑐′(𝑥1) 
                                                 
28 Varian (1992), p.432. 
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This tells us that Firm 1 will produce until marginal private costs to the producer equals the 
given market price p.  But such an output level is inefficient.  We can see this by asking 
ourselves “What would the profit maximizing level of output be if the two entities merged in 
order to internalize any potential externality?”  The profits of the newly merged conglomerate 
would then be 
𝜋 = max
𝑥
 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐(𝑥) − 𝑒(𝑥) 
Which implies that the profit maximizing output of the merged firm, 𝑥2, is 
𝑝 = 𝑐′(𝑥2) + 𝑒′(𝑥2) 
Thus the merged firm will choose 𝑥 such that the sum of the combined costs for the two 
producers equals the given market price 𝑝 .  Inefficiency arises when no merger takes place 
because the firm pollutes too much.  The firm in that case is only taking into account its 
marginal private costs, 𝑐′(𝑥), and ignoring completely the external marginal social costs,  
𝑒′(𝑥), that arise out of the production process.   
At first glance, production externalities seem to be of potential concern within the Norwegian 
plastic bag industry because, as the above analysis tells us, profit maximizing, polluting firms 
left to their own devices will not pollute at socially efficient levels.  In the example above, the 
efficient level of output is 𝑥2 as opposed to 𝑥1 and therefore Firm 1 is producing, and thereby 
polluting, at an inefficiently high level.    
Plastics are resins, or polymers, that have been synthesized from petroleum or natural gas 
derivatives.  Additives are used in some plastics to modify physical characteristics and 
influence aesthetic properties.  Plastic production exploits scarce, non-renewable resources.  
In particular, 4% of the world’s oil and gas consumption is attributable to the production of 
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plastics29.  Each plastic bag produced requires twice its weight in unrefined oil30
Two sectors of the economy are involved with the manufacture of plastic products: 
manufacturers of plastic resins as well as processors who incorporate additives and convert 
resins such that finished plastic products are tailored to ultimate end consumer needs
.   
31
 
. Plastic 
production is a broad industry that encompasses a multitude of sources, actors, inputs, 
outputs, and processing techniques.  Figure 3.1 describes an example of a specific plastic bag 
processing system.  Figure 3.2 describes a generalized plastic processing system.   
Figure 3.1 Specific structure of a plastic unit processing system (Source: plasticbageconomics.com) 
Figure 3.2 Basic structure of a plastic unit processing system (Source: Plastics Europe (2009, p.24)) 
                                                 
29 SFT (2008), p.6. 
30 Ibid, p.6. 
31 USEPA (1990). 
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Damages inflicted upon non-consenting parties via plastic bag production can vary from very 
low levels of local noise pollution to high levels of global and uniformly spreading dangerous 
substances. They include, but are not limited, to the following: stratospheric ozone pollution, 
acid rain, the greenhouse effect, air quality, solid waste production, eutrophication of water 
bodies.  Figure 2.2 reveals that plastic production consumes environmental inputs and emits 
environmentally damaging outputs.  These byproducts of plastic production confer negative 
externalities by transmitting harmful emissions.  For example, vinyl chloride is a key 
ingredient in the production of plastic bags, and it is a proven carcinogenic that may cause 
liver, kidney, or brain damage in people32
CO2 emissions are not unique to plastic bag production.  Rather, these harmful emissions are 
a general production related problem emanating from multiple and diverse industrial sources 
all over the world.  Typically one should target general externalities via general instruments 
and specific externalities via specific instruments.  Otherwise policy instruments that single 
out plastic bag production in particular may result in inefficiency.  The Least Cost Theorem of 
pollution control necessitates that emission taxes must be uniform across emitters for 
uniformly mixing pollutants (Perman et al., 2003, p.204).  So, for example, if you introduce 
an emission tax unique to plastic bag producers and not to other emitters the result will be 
non-uniform taxes.  Cost inefficiency ensues.  Thus, the general nature of the market failures 
associated with plastic bag production, at least those associated with CO2 emissions, would 
best be addressed by a general instrument.   
. To illustrate the more general point, let’s consider 
the example of  CO2 emissions. 
                                                 
32 Maltoni & Lefamine (2006), p.1-2. 
15 
 
Such a general instrument indeed exists, in Europe for example, in the form of a marketable 
emissions permit system33.  Since 2005, when the European Union Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS) was implemented, a quantitative limit on CO2 emissions has been imposed.  
Tradable market permits are now allocated and traded by virtually all stationary, industrial, 
and electricity-generating installations within the EU34
3.2 Consumption Externalities and Consumption  
.  Thus I conclude that negative 
externalities associated with plastic bag production in Norway can and at least partly are 
addressed by general emission instruments.  With that in mind, we move onward in our 
analysis by evaluating consumption externalities. 
CO2 emissions from plastic bag production are an example of a production externality, 
defined as such because the pollution source is a producer.   Externalities can come from 
other sources as well, and consumption externalities are similarly defined due to extraneous 
external costs arising from consumption activity.  Consumption externalities are much more 
specific to plastic bags than the production externalities identified above.  The following 
section uses economic theory to explain how a littering problem can occur.   
3.2.1 Public Goods  
A public good is different from an ordinary private good because of two inherent 
characteristics, non-excludability and non-rivalry35
                                                 
33 See Perman et al. (2003), Chapter 7, for a detailed description of how marketable emission permits function. 
.  A good is non-excludable if people 
cannot be excluded from consuming it.  A good is non-rival if one person’s consumption does 
not reduce the availability of that good for others.  If a good possesses both of the 
34 Ellerman and Buchner (2007), p.66. 
35 All claims in this paragraph are attributable to Perman et al. (2003), p.126-127. 
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aforementioned traits then it is a public good.   If a good possesses none of the traits then it is 
a private good.    
Littering of plastic bags can affect commodities that possess public good characteristics.  One 
is the local environment in the sense of subjective aesthetic levels (“aesthetics”).  Another is 
biodiversity. And yet another public good is the avoidance of human catastrophe. It might be 
difficult for non-economists to imagine aesthetics, biodiversity, and avoidance of human 
catastrophe as goods per se since they are not available for purchase on any market.  
However, consumers can use valuable time and effort to avoid littering plastic bags thereby 
attaining a better aesthetic environment, more biodiversity, and a lower probability of human 
catastrophe. Full income is a generalized income measure based on the idea that a consumers’ 
total endowment consists of income (and/or wealth) as well as time available and effort 
capacity36
3.2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma  
.  This full income can be allocated between private and public goods.   In this 
sense, consumers are endowed with a requisite unit of account and medium of exchange 
needed to “purchase” the public good.   
Non-cooperative game theory is a tool that allows us to predict behavior of economic agents 
that independently maximize their own utility, where the outcome of one agent’s decision is 
dependent on the decision of another37
Here I modify a simple two -player pollution abatement game found in Perman et al. (2003) 
to the case at hand.  We assume a consumer retains the services of a plastic bag at the point-
.   It will help us understand the economic motivations 
behind the littering problem.   
                                                 
36 Whereas market analysis usually imagines agents endowed with monetary budgets that purchase 
commodities with monetary prices, congestion analysis often imagines agents endowed with time budgets who 
choose activities that consume time.  See Becker (1965) for a description of the economics of time allocation.  
37 Game theory concepts and definitions can be found in, for example, Vega-Redondo (2003). 
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of-purchase for the primary purpose of immediately transporting purchased items.  The 
consumer has two options upon completion of transport.  She  must choose one of the options 
and chooses only once.  The options are to litter or not litter.  She can choose Not Litter by 
reusing or recycling the bag immediately, for example.  Alternatively, she can choose to Litter 
the bag by releasing it into the open environment.  Allow the players in this game to be two 
different Consumers, X and Y.  The two players are identical.  The elements of this game are 
depicted in Figure 3.3 below.   
The two horizontal rows correspond to X’s binary choice options whereas the two vertical 
columns correspond to Y’s binary choice options.  The pair of numbers in each cell denotes 
the individual utilities, or net payoffs (𝑈𝑥(𝑎, 𝑏),𝑈𝑦(𝑎, 𝑏))  that accrue to each player given 
the corresponding choices in the figure38
Designating some hypothetical values for these cases, we can calculate the payoff for each 
situation.  The costs, C(a), are private in nature and therefore accrue only to those who choose 
not to litter.  The costs C(a) are identical for each player, a function only of her own choice.  
 . Seen from the point of view of each individual 
player, a is her own action and b is the action of her opponent.  This net payoff measurement 
takes into account the private and social benefits accruing to each as well as the private costs 
accruing to each.   
Assume that 
C (Not Litter) = 7,    C (Litter) = 0 
A benefit, B(a,b), on the other hand, is a function that depends on the choice pair resulting 
from both players’ choices. Any player that chooses not to litter will confer a social benefit to 
                                                 
38 Where 𝑈𝑥 is defined as the amount of net benefits that accrue to player X and, similarly, 𝑈𝑦 is the amount of 
net benefits that accrue to player Y.  
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both players. This is due to the non-excludability nature of public goods.  The benefits 
function is symmetric, so the order of a and b does not matter. 
Assume that 
B (Not Litter, Not Litter) = 10, B (Litter, Not Litter) = 5,   B (Litter, Litter) = 0 
We can now define individual utility, or net payoffs by subtracting costs from benefits for 
each possible scenario: 
Payoff for each when both choose Not Litter: 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝐵(𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) −  𝐶(𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) =  10 − 7 = 3 
Payoff for the Litterer when one chooses Litter and the other chooses Not Litter: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝐵(𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) −  𝐶(𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) =  5 − 0 = 5 
Payoff for the Non-Litterer when one chooses Litter and the other chooses Not Litter: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝐵(𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) −  𝐶(𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) =  5 − 7 =  −2 
Payoff for each when both choose Litter: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝐵(𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) −  𝐶(𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) =  0 − 0 = 0 
 
Litter  No Litter 
Litter 0, 0 5, -2 
 No Litter -2, 5 3, 3 
Figure 3.3  A two-player litter abatement game (Source: Perman et al. (2003), p.301) 
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Immediately we see that the payoff patterns in the environmental dilemma at hand closely 
parallel that of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game39
Nash equilibrium can be defined as a case in which each player in the game has chosen her 
strategy and neither player can unilaterally benefit from altering that decision
.  PD games help demonstrate inefficiency 
problems that arise when provision of public goods are left to private individuals.  Each 
player (in this case each plastic bag consumer) maximizes her own utility conditional on 
expectations of how others act.   
40.  A dominant 
strategy is a strategy which is optimal for a player no matter how that player’s opponent 
chooses to play41.   Whether or not a dominant strategy exists is dependent on the payoff 
matrix associated with the game42
The above game illustrates important results for the issue at hand.  Look at X’s options.  If Y 
chooses Not Litter, X will rationally choose Litter (5 > 0).  If Y instead chooses Litter, X will 
still rationally choose Litter (0 > -2).  Thus, no matter what Y chooses, X will always receive 
a higher net benefit by littering.  Furthermore, the symmetry of the matrix implies the exact 
same outcome for Y given any choice by X.  In this way littering is the dominant strategy for 
both players (a fundamental assumption in non-cooperative game theory is that players 
choose a dominant strategy should one exist).  This game thus has a unique solution: 
everybody litters.  Neither consumer wants to expend the time and energy required to reuse 
and recycle.  Of course both players prefer a clean environment to a littered one, but choose to 
litter in hopes of piggybacking on the non-littering contributions of others.  The economic 
term for such behavior is called free riding.  The unique solution is a Nash Equilibrium. 
.   
                                                 
39 Prisoner’s dilemma concepts and definitions can be found in, for example, Vega-Redondo (2003). 
40 Black, J. (2002), p.313. 
41 Black, J. (2002), p.129. 
42 Vega-Redondo (2003), p.136. 
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The implications are troublesome for two main reasons.  First, the choices made ultimately 
lead to a non-Pareto efficient outcome - payoffs are lower for everyone than they would have 
been had everybody instead chosen not to litter.  Second, it demonstrates the theoretical 
possibility that pure utility maximizing behavior can cause a littering problem, even if it 
would be in everybody’s interest to avoid littering.  This PD game is a relevant model to the 
extent that the structure of the payoff matrix corresponds to reality.   
We can further analyze individual behavior in the case of consumption externalities within a 
public good framework by following Cornes and Sandler (1996).  Their model has the 
advantage of extending the number of consumers in the economy to that of a large population.  
Consider a model where a profit maximizing consumer has preferences for two goods, y and q, denoting a normal private good and a pure public good, respectively.  We can imagine the 
private good as being an aggregate of all private goods regularly purchased in that 
individual’s goods basket.  The utility function U(y, Q) is strictly quasi-concave, increasing, 
continuous and differentiable in the second-degree for both arguments.   A consumer can 
choose to spend her exogenously set income, I, on either the private good or the public good.  
Any amount of the public good purchased by the consumer is denoted as 𝑞, where the 
aggregate of the total public good expenditure within the economy is 
 𝑄 = (∑  𝑞ℎ) +  𝑞 =  𝑄 �𝑛ℎ=1 +  𝑞  
Where 𝑞ℎ denotes the quantity contributed by the other ℎ individuals in the community .  The 
rest of the community’s public good spending is 
𝑄� ≡ 𝑄 − 𝑞.   
Assume perfect substitutability between q and 𝑄� , which means individuals take into account 
only the level of the public good and not who it is that is contributing.  Remember, the non-
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rivalry and non-excludability traits of the public good ensures that each consumer, no matter 
what their personal contribution 𝑞 is, cannot be denied access to the 𝑄�  contributed by other 
society members.  Maximization of utility is subject to a budget constraint. The individuals’ 
budget constraint becomes:  
𝑦 +  𝑝𝑄𝑞 = 𝐼 
Where 𝑝𝑄 denotes the relative price of the public good compared to the numéraire price of the 
private good, y 43
First we find that the consumers utility is a function of q, 𝑄� ,𝒑𝒒 and 𝑰.  The latter two 
variables, which are bolded above, are influential to the consumer’s utility but exogenously 
fixed and therefore outside of the consumer’s control.   
.  Notice that the budget constraint assumes equality, meaning consumers 
choose to spend their entire earnings.  This allows us, as shown below, to solve for the 
consumer’s utility via the budget constraint in terms of the two quantities, q and 𝑄� .  The 
graphical depiction of the single public good model, found below in Figure 3.4, rests on the 
observation that since the budget constraint holds with equality, it can be used to eliminate the 
private good from the utility function.  Thus we can invoke a two dimensional graphic 
representation that exploits the function 𝑈�⃗ (𝑞,𝑄�).   
𝑈(𝑦,𝑄) = 𝑈�𝐼 − 𝑝𝑄𝑞, 𝑞 +  𝑄��  ≡ 𝑈�⃗ (𝑞,𝑄� ;  𝒑𝑸, 𝑰) 
To create the graphical depiction in figure 3.4, we first create a family of indifference curves 
in (𝑞,𝑄�)-space implied by the consumer’s preferences.  An indifference curve is a diagram 
that represents an individual’s taste preference in the sense that any point along an 
indifference curve represents different combinations of the public and private good that 
                                                 
43 Although this is a monetary constraint, the model can be generalized to include time and/or effort costs a lá 
Becker (1965). 
22 
 
provide constant welfare.  Higher indifference curves imply higher welfare ( 𝑖 ≻ 𝑖′ ≻ 𝑖′′ in 
figure 3.4)44
                                                 
44  Here, ” ≻ " means strictly preferred. 
.  The vertical line BB truncates this indifference map and can be interpreted as 
the level of q that exhausts the budget constraint.  The individual in this model is a quantity-
taker and thus chooses her contribution level q after the other society members have chosen 
their individual 𝑞ℎ , until their aggregated total supply 𝑄�  has been determined.  For a given 
value of this exogenously determined 𝑄�  we draw horizontal dotted lines that represent the 
feasible set facing the consumer we are analyzing.  A necessary condition for an individual 
optimum to exist is tangency between the indifference curve and the dotted line, which is 
where marginal costs and marginal benefits equate for the individual decision maker.  When 
the level of 𝑄�  increases (the rest of the community collectively begins to spend more), a 
domain of individual best responses ensues, labeled NN, which delineates the individual’s 
best response to each exogenously determined level of 𝑄� .  In economics it is often assumed 
that this individual reaction curve is downwards sloping (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 147).  
This means that there exists a specific level of 𝑄�  which, when attained, saturates the market 
for public contribution.  At that specific 𝑄�  point of community public spending, an increment 
of 𝑞 always provides the individual with a marginal benefit less than the marginal cost.  Thus, 
at that exact point, the individual will maximize utility by spending her entire income on 
private goods instead of public goods.  So we see that there exists a spectrum of 
environmental quality in which the individual will be willing to spend her income on 
improving the environment by not littering (to the left of 𝑁𝑁).  However, as a tangency point 
is reached (many within society are contributing), the individual will interpret the 
environment personally clean enough for her to litter more often.  In other words, the 
economy’s ability to collectively attain a completely litter-free environment is compromised.  
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The result is discouraging because, in this model, a 100% litter-free environment would never 
occur given rational, classical economic actors. 
 
Figure 3.4  Indifference map in (q,𝑄�)-space (Source: Cornes & Sandler (1996, p.146)) 
3.3 The Littering Problem 
3.3.1 Costs and Benefits of Plastic Bag Littering  
This section outlines some of the costs and benefits of plastic bag littering.  It might be 
difficult for a non-economist to acknowledge that benefits can arise from any littering 
whatsoever.  Economists, on the other hand, might not agree so readily and instead seek to 
find levels of pollution that are Pareto efficient. An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient 
if it is impossible from a welfare standpoint to make any person better off without making at 
least one other worse off.  Littering activities create both costs and benefits accruing to actors 
in the economic activity, residual flow, and environmental damage stages of the plastic bag 
lifecycle.  Policymakers seeking to achieve a Pareto optimal situation must account for both 
benefits as well as damages when determining an optimal emission level.  Nordhaus (2007, 
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p.9-10) states that “The essence of an economic analysis is to convert or translate all 
economic activities into a common unit of account, and then to compare different approaches 
by their impact on the total amount” and that “…economic welfare – properly measured – 
should include everything that is of value to people, even if those things are not included in 
the marketplace”. 
From a welfare point of view, plastic bag consumers derive utility throughout the plastic bag 
consumption experience.  If we assume that at least some plastic bag litter is an inevitable, 
albeit unintentional result of plastic bag consumption, then utilization of these valuable 
consumption benefits will not be possible without generating at least some plastic bag litter.  
In this sense, plastic bag consumers gain utility via plastic bag littering.  But benefits of 
littering can occur at least in two ways: unintentional littering (which brings benefits because 
it's an unavoidable by-product of beneficial plastic bag consumption), and intentional littering 
(as in the PD game), which provides benefits because one avoids the costs/ inconvenience of 
bringing the bag to a safe deposit place. 
The Prima facie task of the plastic bag is to transport items from point-of-purchase to the 
ultimate destination.  The plastic bag is a popular product, even ubiquitous, because it is well 
suited to its task – it is cheap, lightweight, resource efficient, functional, moisture resistant, 
allows for quick packing at the store, and is remarkably strong for its weight45
                                                 
45 Environment Australia (2002), p.4. 
.   Additionally, 
the plastic bag has multi-use applicability.  Because of its inherent carrying and containing 
capabilities, the plastic bag can of course be used beyond its intended, single-transaction life.  
Furthermore the benefits arising out of plastic bag littering do not accrue only to consumers.  
Plastic producers are indirect benefactors of plastic bag littering driven by consumption.  For 
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example, in 2008 the plastics industry provided employment to 1.6 million people in the 
European Union, a number two-thirds that of the automobile industry46
Costs of littering are more straightforward.  If we follow both the above models displaying the 
prisoner’s dilemma nature of consumption externalities, then we understand that littering will 
invariably occur wherever plastic bags are part of the marketplace.  This is a concern due to 
the negative externalities that arise from plastic bag consumption via litter.  Plastic bags are 
especially salient components of the litter stream because they are lightweight (thereby easily 
airborne), moisture resistant (thereby float in waterways), and they degrade slowly (thereby 
persisting in the environment for longer periods than, say, paper bags)
. 
47
3.3.2 Aesthetics  
.  We saw in Chapter 
2 that the littering problem is the most frequently stated reason for adoption provided by 
international jurisdictions that have chosen to adopt plastic bag regulations.   Littering can 
negatively impact the utility of non-consenting parties via three types of commodities that all 
possess public good characteristics: aesthetics, biodiversity, and avoidance of human 
catastrophe.   
Littering is defined here according to the Norwegian pollution law (forurensningsloven §27) 
as discarding, leaving behind, storing, or transport of waste such that it can appear to mar or 
damage the environment48
                                                 
46 Plastics Europe (2008), p.6. 
.  In general, litter can be classified in a variety of ways.  This is 
reflected in plastic bag research results, which are often reported in different measurement 
denominations (i.e. units per area, weight, surface area, material type, etc.).   As such, 
measuring aesthetics is a difficult task because no universal measurement standard is in place 
47 Environment Australia (2002), p.29. 
48 SFT (2000), p.5. 
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to help accurately convey the magnitude of littering problems.  In addition, dependable 
littering studies unique to plastic bags are virtually non-existent49
 
.   
 
3.3.3 Biodiversity Loss 
 “The library of life is burning and we do not even know the titles of the books” 
-DR. GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND, former Director-General of the 
World Health Organization and former Prime Minister of Norway, on 
biological diversity50
The United Nations agreed to a global Convention on Biological Diversity in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992, a clear display of the increasing concern over worldwide biodiversity loss and the 
recognition of a need to intervene via conservation and sustainable development.   The 
objectives of the convention are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of 
its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization 
of genetic resources
 
51.  The United Nations (UN) has stated that “the adverse effects of 
human impacts on biodiversity are increasing dramatically and threatening the very 
foundation of sustainable development”52.  Rising consumption is one of the primary causes 
of biodiversity loss53
                                                 
49 Green Dot Norway (2010). 
.  Pearce and Moran (1994) define biological resources as simply those 
components of biodiversity which maintain current or potential human uses.  Biodiversity in 
this case describes the number, variability, and variety of living organisms in a given domain, 
50 Chivian & Bernstein (2008), p.117. 
51 UNEP (2001), p.8. 
52 Ibid, p.8. 
53 Ministry of Environment (2001), p.8. 
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as well as the natural devices that keep such organism alive within that domain.  As will be 
shown, plastic bag littering has a deleterious effect on many wildlife groups.  
As the popularity of plastics increases worldwide54, so has the amount of plastic pollution55.  
It is estimated that one million tons of plastic are dumped into oceans worldwide every year56.  
Studies of coastal debris demonstrate that 60-80% of wastes accumulating ashore are 
composed of plastic57.  The UN Environment Program estimated in 2006 that every square 
mile of ocean contains 46,000 pieces of floating plastic58
It is difficult to know precisely what fraction of these are plastic bags.  But plastic bags have 
proven deleterious effects on marine biota.  Kofi Annan, former secretary of the UN, stated 
that marine litter is killing up to one million sea birds and 100,000 seas mammals each year
.  
59.  
At least 267 species are affected worldwide, including 86% of all sea turtles, 44% or all 
seabirds, and 43% of all marine mammal species60.  Plastic bags are lethal to marine life 
mostly due to ingestion and entanglement.  Some species are particularly susceptible to plastic 
bag litter.  Sea turtles, for example, often mistake plastic bags for common prey such as 
jellyfish and squid61.   In one survey, more than 97% of Laysan Albatrosses were found to 
contain plastics62.  Among those that died, the average burden was 1% of their bodyweight.  
Another major issue concerns the food chain network effects attributable to toxic additives 
found in plastics.  The organic compound PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) found in plastic 
bags, for example, can cause reproductive disorders or even death, even at very low levels63
                                                 
54 Plastics Europe (2008), p.6. 
.  
55 Plastics Europe (2008), p.2. 
56 Chivian & Bernstein (2008), p.59. 
57 Derraik (2002), p.843. 
58 UNEP (2001), p.7. 
59 Chivian & Bernstein(2008), p.59. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Derraik (2002), p.846. 
28 
 
Ingestion of these additives by sea animals diffuses further up the food chain, and can 
ultimately affect humans that eat seafood.  In general, biodiversity directly impacts human 
welfare - by providing medicines from nature; by ensuring adequate production and supply of 
food for the human population; by minimizing the implications for the spread of human 
infectious diseases64
One specific area of the globe has drawn attention to the littering problem that occurs in 
oceans.  Although underdocumented, scientists have purported the existence of a waste 
“vortex” in the Pacific Ocean, 500 nautical miles in size that accumulates a disproportionately 
high fraction of the world’s discarded plastics due to the centripetal direction of the sea 
current there
.   
65. Because of their buoyant nature, plastic debris can be transported over long 
distances and can persist in the environment for long periods of time66.  The durability of 
plastics allows plastic bags to last anywhere from an estimated 3 to 10 years in water67. The 
additives can permeate into the ocean and last for an estimated 30-50 years68
3.3.4 Human Catastrophe  
.  Regardless of 
the disputed existence of the aforementioned vortex, the buoyancy of plastic bags, the 
persistence of their chemical makeup and the increasing amount of littering taking place 
points towards plastic bag litter as an increasingly serious externality. 
Some jurisdictions are susceptible to catastrophic externalities to the local human population 
as a result of plastic bag littering.  Major flooding can be and has been the result of littered 
plastic bags in some places.  For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, India and Bangladesh 
are two countries that have experienced fatal floods as an outcome of plastic bag littering.   
                                                 
64 See Chivian and Bernstein (2008) for a thorough analysis of the implications on humans of biodiversity loss. 
65 The Independent, February 5, 2008.  
66 Derraik (2002), p.844. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, Malaria, a mosquito-borne infectious disease pervasive in subtropical regions, 
can be expedited by way of plastic bag litter.  Plastic bags that fill with rainwater can offer 
ideal breeding grounds for mosquitoes.  Wangari Mathaai, the assistant environment minister 
in Kenya and 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner, has performed experiments that link plastic bag 
litter with malaria69
                                                 
69 UNEP, (2005). 
.   
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4 Potential Strategies for 
Implementation  
It was shown in Chapter 2 that, in general, unregulated market equilibria will be inefficient in 
the presence of externalities.  Naturally the next step is to evaluate various alternative 
regulation strategies to see if they lead to more efficient outcomes.   The previous chapter 
provides us an ad hoc list of potential strategies to evaluate for implementation, namely the 
regulations that have been used to date worldwide.  The first strategy is complete prohibition.  
In that case, the government may, for example, enact a performance based CAC by 
completely banning consumption, production, and importation of plastic bags.  The second 
strategy is partial prohibition.  In that case the policymakers could, for example, enact a 
technology based CAC strategy in which producers and consumers are forbidden from 
utilizing thicker HDPE bags.  These two strategies could also entail strict enforcement 
mechanisms designed to minimize black markets, hidden use, or any other sorts of actions 
that compromise the integrity of a prohibition instrument. Note that in the previous chapter 
we determined the most relevant externality in this case to be the littering problem.  As such, 
this chapter sets out to evaluate the economic nature and welfare effects of the current 
worldwide regulation strategies.   
4.1 Prohibition  
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, economists seek to find levels of emissions that are 
Pareto efficient.  Littering activities create both benefits and costs accruing to actors during 
the unit processing system.  Policymakers seeking to achieve a Pareto optimal situation must 
account for both benefits as well as costs when determining an optimal littering level.   
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Here we will follow Perman et al. (2003, Chapter 5) in their partial equilibrium analysis of 
market efficiency to show that any Pareto efficient level of plastic bag littering will occur at 
the point of maximized total net benefits in society (NB).  It begins by identifying the benefits 
and costs to society of plastic bag littering.   Then, defining net benefits as total benefits 
minus total costs, an efficient level of plastic bag littering would be one that maximizes net 
benefits70
Assume that 
.   
𝐵′(𝐿) > 0, 𝐵′′(𝐿)  < 0, 𝐶′(𝐿)  > 0, 𝐶′′(𝐿)  < 0  
Where 𝐵 means aggregate benefits of littering, 𝐶 means aggregate costs of littering, 𝐿 is the 
level of plastic bag littering, single primes denote first-order derivatives, and double primes 
denote second-order derivatives. 
Consider the following maximization problem: 
max𝐿 𝑁𝐵  = 𝐵(𝐿) −  𝐶(𝐿)  
Then, solving the above leaves us with the following first order condition 
𝜕𝐵(𝐿∗)
𝜕𝐿
 =  𝜕𝐶(𝐿∗)
𝜕𝐿
  
Figure 4.1 gives us an intuitive idea of these results.  In that graph, the x-axis represents the 
quantity of littering whereas the y-axis represents economic value (NOK).  In this case an 
efficient level of littering, 𝐿∗, occurs at the situation where the marginal benefits of littering 
and the marginal costs of littering intersect.  If the actual level of emissions, 𝐿𝑎 , is such that  
                                                 
70 The hypothetical net payoff functions we used in the prisoner’s dilemma game in Chapter 3 could apply here.  
Note, however, that the notation is now used in a slightly different way than in that chapter, since we now 
discuss aggregate rather than individual costs and benefits, as a function of aggregate rather than individual 
littering levels. 
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𝐿∗ <  𝐿𝑎 ≤ ?̈? , where ?̈? denotes the unconstrained littering level, then the marginal costs of 
littering will be greater than the marginal benefits of littering.   In that situation society can 
decrease littering and achieve a Pareto improvement.  Similarly, if the actual level of 
emissions, 𝐿𝑎, is such that  0 ≤  𝐿𝑎 < 𝐿∗ , then the marginal benefits of littering will be 
greater than the marginal costs of littering.  In that situation society can increase littering and 
achieve a Pareto improvement.  Given that the marginal benefits and marginal costs functions 
are as drawn in Figure 4.1, we immediately see that a prohibition strategy would be inefficient 
in such an economy.   
 
NOK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Quantity of littering 
Figure 4.1. An economy in which the economically efficient littering level is greater than zero (Source: Perman et al. (2003), 
p.173) 
  
A prohibition strategy however need not always be inefficient.  Given some adjustments in 
the marginal benefits and marginal costs functions, we can classify economies in which a 
plastic bag prohibition would indeed be justified. Figure 4.2 gives us an idea of how such an 
economy might look. This figure is similar to Figure 4.1 with the exception that due to the 
positions of the curves, they never cross. These curves may in practice be unique to each 
Marginal Benefits 
Marginal Costs 
𝐿∗ ?̈? 
      𝜇∗ 
0
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jurisdiction. Given that the marginal benefits and marginal costs functions are as drawn in 
Figure 4.2, then the maximization of net benefits would only occur with zero littering, at 𝐿∗ .  
In such an economy a prohibition strategy would be an effective method to attain efficiency. 
 
NOK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Quantity of littering 
Figure 4.2. An economy in which the economically efficient littering level is zero (Source: thesis author) 
 
Whether an economy resembles Figure 4.1 or Figure 4.2 depends on the externalities 
particular to that jurisdiction.  Remember the three potential externalities listed in Chapter 3; 
aesthetics, biodiversity, and human catastrophe.  Figure 4.1 might describe a jurisdiction that 
is experiencing an aesthetics problem.  Figure 4.2 might describe a jurisdiction that is 
experiencing a potential human catastrophe problem.  The difference is in the behavior of the 
benefits and costs functions.  If a jurisdiction is merely experiencing a relatively less harmful 
aesthetics problem, then it is likely that the marginal benefits function begins at a higher point 
than the marginal costs function.  In that case more plastic bag littering is justified because of 
the increased welfare benefits society would garner from the associated plastic bag 
consumption.  However, if a jurisdiction is prone to human catastrophe, then it is likely that 
the marginal costs function begins at a higher point than the marginal benefits function.  In 
Marginal Costs 
Marginal Benefits 
0
   
𝐿∗ ?̈? 
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that case more plastic bag littering is not justified because of the serious repercussions that 
can occur with littering. 
4.2 Pigouvian Taxation  
The idea of environmental taxation was first introduced by A.C. Pigou in his 1920 book The 
Economics of Welfare.  A Pigou tax is a tax levied on a market activity that generates negative 
externalities (such as plastic bag consumption generating a littering problem) in order to fully 
internalize the externality71
 
.  Thus a market that finds itself at an inefficient equilibrium can 
theoretically be corrected by implementing a tax set at a rate equal to the difference between 
the social marginal costs and the private marginal costs, evaluated at the optimum, or a Pigou 
tax.   
Figure 4.1 shows how to find the tax level that will lead to efficiency.  First, locate the 
efficiency equilibrium where the marginal benefits of littering intersect marginal costs of 
littering.  Next, trace a horizontal line towards the x-axis from that point.  Ultimately we end 
up at 𝜇∗, the equilibrium price of littering.  So if an economy indeed displays benefit and cost 
functions as described in Figure 4.1, the attachment of a market price 𝜇∗ to plastic bag 
littering will lead to an efficient economy. 
 
The Pigou tax works because it makes private and social choices compatible by ensuring that 
incentives coincide as such.  As Hoel mentions (1998, p.1), littering taxes might be preferable 
to CAC instruments because they are cost effective.  They are cost effective because it is in 
each actor’s own interest to equate her marginal abatement cost with the littering tax rate.  As 
long as each actor faces the exact same tax rate, marginal abatement will be equalized across 
                                                 
71 Black, J. (2002), p.354. 
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sources, which is a necessary condition for cost effectiveness.  Thus the environmental goal 
will be achieved as cheaply as possible.  Tietenberg (1990, p.17) states that the cost savings 
from using emission taxes instead of CAC instruments are very often substantial.   
It is important to note, however, that a broad-based, community wide consumer tax on the 
purchases of plastic bags would not be a first-best solution for the littering problem.  That is 
because littering is ultimately caused by the consumer, not the plastic bag itself.  Ideally the 
tax burden should be placed on the activity that generates the pollution, rather than the good 
itself (Sandmo, 2009, p.8-9).  A perfectly corrective Pigou tax would actually be charged 
solely to litterers each and every time a plastic bag was littered.  But administrative feasibility 
makes this difficult in practice due to the non-observability of the littering action.  Practically 
speaking this means that both litterers and non-litterers alike will be taxed upon purchase of 
the plastic bag commodity - whether their individual use of those bags convey adverse 
environmental effects or not.  However, as Sandmo (2009, p.9) states, even an imperfect 
regulation may be worthwhile: 
It might perhaps be tempting to draw pessimistic policy conclusions from this analysis: 
If corrective Pigouvian taxes are likely to introduce new distortions, is it not to be 
expected that the net welfare gain from their use might easily become negative? In my 
view, this pessimism is unfounded.  It is important to distinguish between achieving on 
the one hand a social optimum and on the other hand a welfare improvement.  Imperfect 
taxes, if used with good judgement and empirical knowledge, can clearly result in 
substantial welfare improvement in spite of falling short of the first best welfare ideal. 
 
4.3 Behavioral Economics  
Previously, when discussing consumption externalities, we saw that market failure might arise 
when consumers are faced with public versus private good spending decisions.  Specifically, 
we saw that consumers can maximize personal utility by spending their income on private 
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goods while free riding on others’ contributions to the public good.  The implication in the 
plastic bag case is that a littering problem will arise.  This result is based on the classical 
economic assumption that society is comprised of traditional, self-interested, and “rational” 
utility maximizers that are assumed to be able to make judgments towards their subjectively 
defined end.  The name of this economic actor is Homo Oeconomicus.   
In recent years economists have incorporated elements of psychology into economic decision 
making to predict market outcomes with more precision.  A new economic field, Behavioural 
Economics, has been spawned in light of this.  The field emphasizes that consumer behaviour 
is not motivated purely by material payoffs and it seeks to discover the true motives behind 
consumer decision making.  Behavioural Economics amends assumptions behind Homo 
Oeconomicus in order to account for emotional and other factors in the consumer decision-
making process that conventional economics does not account for.  Behavioural economists 
refine the Homo Oeconomicus model by integrating social and/or moral preferences into the 
consumers’ utility function.    According to Pollak (1976), there is nothing in the logic of 
economic thought that mandates the narrow view of preferences found in most neoclassical 
consumer theories.  Behavioural economic tools allow economists to reconcile distortions in 
the Homo Oeconomicus model to help explain, for example, why some people refuse to litter 
even when traditional models insinuate that it is rational for them to do so72
4.3.1 Social Aspects of Perceived Responsibility  
.   
Behavioural Economists incorporate psychological aspects of social and moral norms into 
classical economic methodologies to help analyze modern economic consumer behaviour. 
Andreoni (1990), for example, attempts to explain seemingly irrational public good 
contributions by advocating a utility function that includes an emotional private benefit, 
                                                 
72 Donating blood to the blood bank would be another example. 
37 
 
namely an impurely altruistic “warm glow” feeling that accrues to consumers when they 
contribute to the public good.  This would explain, for example, why some people are willing 
to spend more money on environmentally friendly green goods that are otherwise identical in 
function and form to less environmentally friendly brown good substitutes.  Some other 
notable writings in the behavioural economic and related fields include Akerlof (1980, 1997), 
Becker and Murphy (2000), Durlauf and Young (2001), Elster (1989), Frey (1997), Holländer 
(1990), and Manski (2000)73.  Part of the literature on voluntary contributions is based on 
social norms, where the modelled behaviour is influenced by preferences for social approval 
(e.g. Rege (2004)).  I make the assumption that plastic bag littering occurs when consumers 
are alone and thus devoid of the requisite social incentives required to alter behaviour from a 
social standpoint74.  This means that social norms enforced by social sanctions do not apply to 
the plastic bag littering problem.  However, literature also exists where the modelled 
behaviour is derived predominantly by preferences for a self-image as a morally responsible 
person.  These moral norms might be internalized so as to achieve the collectively best result.  
One implication from these studies is that multiple equilibrium models exist in which 
societies can move from a “bad” equilibrium to a “good” equilibrium.   In turn, government 
policy initiatives might be able to “nudge”75
 
 consumers to behave towards their perceived 
morally ideal way.  If progression from the status quo towards the moral ideal is a Pareto 
improvement (or environmentally better alternative), then economic credo at least justifies 
exploring the issue further.  
                                                 
73 As per Nyborg (2003), p.260. 
74 Social norms could apply to the plastic bag littering problem in the sense that it prevents littering when one 
is not alone.  But that structure would still not provide internalization of social norms when one is alone and 
the incentive to litter plastic bags is at its highest. 
75 The term ”nudge” is attributable to Thaler & Sunstein (2008).  Their book of the same name draws on 
behavioural economic research to defend libertarian paternalism and active engineering of choice architecture. 
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4.3.2 Moral Norms  
Private benefits can accrue to a non-litterer when an internal reward arising from that 
contribution exists that is based on morally responsible behaviour.  As described by Nyborg et 
al. (2006, p.353), such internal rewards depend on the interplay between (a) the contributors’ 
belief that the action in question would benefit others, and, (b) the perception that the action is 
governed by a norm that is observed and recognized by the community at large.  If the 
individual has preferences for developing and maintaining a self-image as a morally 
responsible person, then that person’s self-image will improve when her behaviour 
approaches the perceived morally ideal behaviour.  If this internal reward is positively related 
to others’ contributions, then it can be shown that progression might be made from an 
inefficient equilibrium with a free riding problem to an efficient equilibrium with little or no 
litter.  The following sections adapts Nyborg et al (2006, p.355-358) in order to analyze moral 
motives and determine their relevance to the plastic bag market. 
4.3.3 A Moral Motivation Model  
Assume that a large, finite number of n identical individuals live in a society, and that each 
has purchased and is in possession of a plastic bag.  Each individual, i, has two alternatives, 
Litter or Not Litter.  Not littering confers a personal cost of C to each person.  However, not 
littering also confers two benefits.  The first is S, which is the subjective benefit of attaining a 
favourable self-image when not littering.  The second is the environmental benefit, b, which 
accrues to every person in society (due to the non-excludability aspect of the environment).  It 
seems natural to assume that b < C whereas nb > C.  This means that individuals who do not 
care about their self-image will rationally choose to litter.  A non-littered environment is 
Pareto superior to a littered environment.  We assume that not littering is perceived as the 
morally correct choice. 
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The payoff for an individual opting not to litter is as follows: 
𝑝𝑖 = (𝑆 + 𝑏 − 𝐶)𝑥𝑖 = (𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑖  
Where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ (0,1) where 𝑥𝑖 = 0 means that i litters and 𝑥𝑖 = 1 means that i does not litter. 
The value 𝑐 is defined as the net private cost of not littering: 
𝑐 = 𝐶 − 𝑏 > 0 
Noting that not littering yields an external environmental benefit to all individuals, and that 
the external benefit is increasing in 𝑛: 
𝐵 = 𝑏(𝑛 − 1) 
Such that the net environmental benefit when nobody litters is: 
𝑛2𝑏 
The marginal rate of improvement in self-image is an increasing function of the external 
effect, B, as well as the extent to which the individual perceives not littering to be her 
responsibility, which in turn is an increasing function of the share, 𝑎, of individuals choosing 
Not Litter, where 
𝑎 =  (∑𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
 
The self image benefit function is thus 
𝑆 = 𝑠(𝐵,𝑎),   
𝑠′(𝐵) > 0, 𝑠′′(𝐵)  < 0, 𝑠′(𝑎)  > 0, 𝑠′′(𝑎)  < 0  
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Given the above equations, the decision rule is that an individual chooses Not Litter (𝑥𝑖 = 1) 
whenever the perceived benefit of a positive self-image exceeds the marginal private cost of 
not littering: 
𝑠(𝐵,𝑎) > 𝑐 
It is important at this point to set forth some further assumptions.  Note that a moral 
preference is dependent on the perception that the action is governed by a norm that is 
observed and recognized by the community at large.  In experimental economics humans 
show a strong tendency to conform76, or cooperate conditionally77
1) The act of littering cannot be observed 
.  Moral norms can be 
triggered by signalizing that other people are behaving in the morally appropriate way. This 
requires at least some degree of observability.  In this model I make the following 
assumptions regarding observability: 
2) The resulting litter can be observed 
Norm adherence is observable in the sense that it can be recognized when resulting litter 
levels stagnate or decrease.  This means that if a member of society chooses not to litter, all 
other members of society will notice and register that particular choice in their morally 
impacted payoff function, even though they may not observe the littering action and 
subsequently the identity of the litterer 78
                                                 
76 This conformity, also known as “imitation”, “contagion”, “bandwagon effect”, or “herd behavior”, was 
displayed in, for example, Solomon Asch’s groundbreaking conformity experiment of the 1950’s in which 
experiment participants taking a vision test produced startlingly incorrect answers when they witnessed 
enlisted “confederates” before them make their (incorrect) answer first.  See Larsen (1974) for more. 
.  This observability will affect the self image benefit 
function through the 𝑎 variable.  This happens when individuals have preference interactions 
for internalized moral approval.  Preference interactions happen when one consumer’s 
77 See Fischbacher et al. (2001) for evidence from public good experiments that humans are conditionally 
cooperative. 
78 Social sanctions are not relevant in this model due to the indirect, not direct, observability assumption. 
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preference ordering over the alternatives in a choice set depends on the actions (or even 
preferences) chosen by other consumers (Manski, 2000, p.120-121).  Thus, the choice that 
any society member makes is importantly dependent on what others do.  In this way the 
model differs from neoclassical models in which people act independently of one another.  
This provides us with an infrastructure for moral motivation to stimulate demand for the 
environmentally friendly alternative based on socially contingent moral motivation: 
conditional cooperation can take place. 
4.3.4 Multiple Equilibria 
Nyborg et al (2006, p.365) states that “the existence of multiple Nash Equilibria leaves open 
the possibility that two otherwise identical economies might display highly different 
[propensities for littering]”.  Multiple Nash equilibria can exist in the plastic bag case, as 
follows. 
Assume that: 
𝑠(𝐵, 0) < 𝐶,         𝑠(𝐵, 1) > 𝐶 
So that the subjective benefit obtained when choosing to litter exceeds the net private cost in 
the event that everybody litters, whereas the subjective benefit when choosing not to litter 
exceeds the net private cost in the event that nobody litters.  This means that moral motivation 
is stronger when supported by the observable actions of others.  Given these assumptions, two 
pure strategy Nash Equilibria exist: 
NE (0): Everybody litters(𝑎 = 0), and the sense of personal moral obligation is weak 
NE (1): Nobody litters(𝑎 = 1), and the sense of personal moral obligation is strong 
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4.3.5 Dynamics  
Nyborg et al (2006) use replicator dynamics from evolutionary biology to show how the 
existence of multiple Nash equilibria and dynamics of moral motivation might influence 
consumer behaviour.  The theoretical nature behind replicator dynamics are outside of the 
scope of this thesis, but the conclusions drawn there help us analyze how a society might 
move from a Pareto dominated position where everybody litters, NE (0), to a Pareto optimal 
position where nobody litters, NE (1).   
The evolutionary game dynamics of that paper discern that the growth of a strategy is 
proportional to the success of that strategy, where success is measured by the strategy’s 
payoff relative to the other strategy79
?̇? = 𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝑡
=  𝑎(1 − 𝑎)(𝑠(𝐵,𝑎) − 𝑐), where t = time 
.  For the model at hand, this would imply the following 
dynamics of a:  
This tells us that the popularity of a strategy with a higher payoff will increase at a higher rate 
over time than the strategy with the lower payoff.  It allows us to create a dynamic path 
illustration as depicted in figure 4.1.  In the figure, the two pure Nash equilibria, NE (0) and 
NE (1), are asymptotically stable.  The third Nash equilibrium, NE (a'), is an unstable, mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium that operates as a tipping point.  Here, each individual litters with a 
probability 𝑎′.  This 𝑎′ is defined implicitly such that: 
𝑠(𝐵,𝑎′) =  𝑐  
                                                 
79 See Nyborg et al. (2006, p.357) for a more comprehensive look at how these replicator dynamics are 
determined. 
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The tipping point is vulnerable to small changes in the share of individuals adopting one of 
the policies.  Incremental changes towards 𝑎 = 0 (𝑎 = 1) will initiate movements towards a 
completely littered (non-littered) equilibrium80
𝑎 > 𝑎′ ⇒ Moves the economy permanently to 𝑁𝐸(1), or a “virtuous circle” 
. 
𝑎 < 𝑎′ ⇒ Moves the economy permanently to 𝑁𝐸(0), or a “vicious circle” 
 
Figure 4.3  Dynamic development of the share of non-litterers (Source: Nyborg et al., 2006) 
4.3.6 Taxation as a Moral Incentive to Eliminate Littering  
Nyborg et al (2006, p.358-359) analyze policy mechanisms (such as taxes) and their relevance 
to socially contingent moral motivation.  The following section discusses how a consumer tax 
on plastic bags might persuade consumers to choose the preferred behaviour in this model, 
thereby creating the virtuous circle that ultimately propels society to the preferred, no-litter 
equilibrium. 
Assume that a society is positioned at NE (0) where everybody litters their plastic bag.  Now 
suppose that government enacts a tax on all plastic bags at point-of-purchase locations 
                                                 
80 Note: In this model, individuals are identical.  If they were not identical we might see some economic actors 
that do not have preferences for internalized moral approval (i.e. Homo Oeconomicus).  If this is the case then 
the environment will not be perfectly litter free in practice.  
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throughout the country.  A tax implementation will be reflected in a price increase, and the 
higher price will reduce demand for plastic bags.  Individuals will only purchase plastic bags 
if their use value exceeds the price of the tax.  Low use valuers will drop out of the plastic bag 
market81
There are two mechanisms that pressure individuals to stop littering in this model.  First, a tax 
can potentially stimulate a moral incentive for individuals to stop littering.  If the tax changes 
the self-image effect of littering, either through consumer beliefs about the fraction of non-
litterers or about the external benefits of non-littering, then the tax can sometimes be 
sufficient to move the economy to the other equilibrium.   
.  We assume that plastic bag littering levels are a monotonically increasing function 
of plastic bag purchases such that littering levels will drop as plastic bags are purchased with 
decreasing frequency.  Individuals will then observe and recognize the stagnating or 
diminishing levels of visible litter, which may lead them to conclude that the share of non-
litterers now exceeds 𝑎′.  This could potentially make the economy move to the non-littering 
equilibrium.  Also, it is conceivable that consumers may interpret a tax as a signal that the 
environmental effects of littering are more important than they previously thought, i.e. that the 
external benefits of not littering, 𝐵, are larger than previously believed.  Since 𝑆 depends 
on 𝐵, this could also potentially move the economy to the other equilibrium. 
The second mechanism behind the behavioural change is caused by the altered monetary 
incentives induced by the plastic bag tax.   A tax implementation will make the cost of 
littering increase.  If the littering option becomes more expensive than the non-littering 
option, the original position NE (0) would no longer be a Nash Equilibrium.  In fact, 
                                                 
81 Given a multi-period setting, it seems reasonable that some consumers will rationally purchase fewer bags 
over time and instead reuse previously purchased bags as often as possible to avoid repeatedly incurring the 
tax.  That situation is outside of this mode.  Here, each consumer is assumed to own only one plastic bag and 
make her littering/non-littering choice only once. 
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according to Rege (2004)82
Such a process invokes policy measures that influence consumer perceptions of the littering 
problem, with an ultimate eye towards altering consumer behaviour.  If the tax can stimulate 
widespread disapproval of the littering problem, moral norms can be internalized into 
consumer utility functions such that the ultimate decisions – despite being based on self-
interest – are associated with less negative externalities.  The end result would be a more 
efficient system and a less littered environment.   
, the model can be interpreted to suggest that even a temporary tax 
would be sufficient enough to create such a permanent shift.  In that situation the removal of 
the tax after full compliance has been attained would not alter the consumer’s impression that 
littering is the morally incorrect decision to make.  Such a result would presume that there is 
no signalling effect of removing the tax such that 𝐵 (or rather, consumers' perception of B) 
becomes smaller.   
4.3.7 Public Awareness as a Moral Incentive to Eliminate Littering  
Moral norms can be triggered by signalizing that either many people or a select few influential 
people are behaving in the morally appropriate way83
Advertising campaigns are a way of creating stimulus response compatibility.  The idea of 
stimulus response compatibility is that the stimulus causing moral norm change is consistent 
.  When considering the plastic bag 
littering problem it is vital to study the determinants of consumer choice, including public 
policy’s capability to influence those choices.  Public authorities often use advertising 
campaigns where the purpose is solely to remind consumers of their moral responsibilities 
(Nyborg, 2003, p.259).   
                                                 
82 This was presented in a different context.  It was presented within a social norm motivation model. 
83 Thaler & Sunstein (2009, p.64). 
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with the ultimately desired action without forbidding any options84.  Creators of such 
campaigns are called choice architects (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).  Choice architects have the 
responsibility of organizing the context in which people make decisions85. A nudge is any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in predictable ways.  As shown 
above, a consumer tax on plastic bags could function as the stimulus required to nudge a 
society towards a non-littering environment.  However, a properly designed advertising 
campaign or public awareness effort coinciding with the tax might be needed to strengthen - 
or at least would not negatively influence - the effects of the tax in the model.  This is one 
interpretation of what the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
did in Ireland when they introduced that country’s plastic bag tax.  In that case, the 
advertising campaign that accompanied the consumer tax was originally intended as a 
mechanism to protect retailers from appearing to “profiteer” from the tax86.  But the ultimate 
effect of the public awareness campaign was to create a link between price and good 
environmental behaviour in the public mind87.  Thus the internalization of the moral norm 
was achieved by manipulating - or framing88
A public awareness campaign (alone) might be able to stimulate the correct moral behaviour.  
One example of a successful advertising campaign that used conformity to combat a littering 
problem occurred in the USA in the 1980’s when Texas successfully reduced their highway 
 -product attributes such that the schema of 
interpretation the consumers relied on to understand the choice option was altered.  The tax on 
plastic bags functioned as a salient signal to consumers of the littering problem that 
accompanies plastic bag consumption.   
                                                 
84 Ibid. (2009, p.90). 
85 Ibid. (2009, p.3). 
86 Convery et al, (2007, p.6). 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Tversky & Kahneman (1981) for information on framing effects and their role in the psychology of choice. 
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litter problem89.  Initially the Texas government grew frustrated when numerous expensive 
and highly publicized advertising campaigns did not achieve their ultimate goal of curbing 
their considerable highway littering problem.  However, in 1986, the Texas Department of 
Transportation implemented a state-wide advertising campaign aimed at altering moral 
behaviour towards littering by stimulating allegiance towards the local public good.  The 
slogan of the campaign, “Don’t Mess with Texas”, was supplemented by advertisements that 
included famous Texans90 imploring citizens to address their civic duty by not littering91
One example of a tax successfully combining with an informational campaign is the Irish 
PlastTax.  Convery et al (2007, p.9-10) states that that the primary lesson in the PlastTax case 
was two-fold. “Firstly, the introduction of a price signal through the use of a product tax can 
influence consumer behaviour significantly; secondly, ensuring stakeholder and consumer 
acceptance of the tax is central to the successful implementation of such a tax.  Informational 
campaigns highlighting the environmental impacts… are central in ensuring such 
acceptance”. 
. In 
this way the campaigns stimulated an association between the consumer action of not littering 
and morally correct behaviour.  The results were substantial; visible litter was reduced 29% 
after the first year of the campaign inception and 72% after six years. 
                                                 
89 All information regarding the Texas highway case attributable to Thaler & Sunstein (2008, p.64-65). 
90 For example musician Willie Nelson, actor Chuck Norris, and athlete Lance Armstong are some of the people 
since 1986 that have lent their names to the ongoing campaign. 
91 Thaler & Sunstein (2009, p.64). 
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5 The Norwegian Marketplace  
Norway is a high usage plastic bag nation.  In general, Norway, along with Denmark and 
Ireland, produce the highest levels of per-capita waste in Europe92.  Norwegians consumed 
approximately 1 billion plastic bags in 200893.  The total weight of this refuse was 15,000 
tons, or approximately 3% of the 500,000 tons total plastic waste amount in Norway94.  
Yearly consumption of plastic bags rounds to approximately five hundred units per family, or 
about 7kg of plastic bag consumption per capita each year95.  Plastic bags comprise 20% of all 
general plastic packaging in the Norwegian marketplace96
In chapter 3 it was shown that two sectors of the economy are involved with the manufacture 
of plastic products: manufacturers of plastic resins as well as processors.  An analysis of the 
Norwegian marketplace shows that plastic bags in Norway are predominantly imported.  Most 
of the imports come from China and Sweden
.  
97.  There are currently zero Norwegian 
manufacturing firms in Norway, one major Norwegian processing firm (Norfolier Norge AS), 
and four minor processing firms (Beca Plastindusri AS, Petroplast Industrier AS, Serviteur 
AS, Tommen Gram Folie AS) 98
It was also shown in Chapter 3 that major production externalities, such as CO2 emissions, are 
not unique to plastic bag production.  Thus, the general nature of the market failures 
associated with plastic bag production, at least those associated with CO2 emissions, would 
best be addressed by a general instrument such as the EU ETS.  Norway joined the European 
.   
                                                 
92 SFT (2008), p.19. 
93 Ibid, p.10. 
94 Ibid, p.10. 
95 Ibid, p.12. 
96 Ibid, p.10. 
97 Personal communication with Eirik Oland, Green Dot, 09.09.10.  
98 Ibid. 
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Union Emission Trading Scheme in 200799
Norway does not seem to have a littering problem.  Keep Norway Clean (Hold Norge Rent) is 
a Norwegian organization that sends out voluntary dugnad
 and the aforementioned firms are required to 
comply with this agreement. 
100 groups into Norwegian public 
and nature areas to pick up litter.  Via analyses from these experiences, Keep Norway Clean is 
of the opinion that the plastic bag littering problem in Norway is minimal101.  On the contrary, 
there is more evidence that suggests Norwegians are very effective reusers of plastic bags102
In Norway 80% of plastic bags are reused for various functions
.    
103.  We can deduce some of 
the indirect benefits of plastic bag use in Norway by analyzing, for example, the sources of 
plastic bags that ultimately end up in Norwegian landfill sites, as described in Table 5.1104
                                                 
99 European Union (2007). 
.  
The table shows that a fraction of Norwegian plastic bags are well utilized.  Plastic bags can 
even be interpreted to be environmentally friendly; it is insightful to see, for example, that 
plastic bags are used to transport and recycle plastic bottles.  Bottle recycling stations are 
standard in Norwegian grocery stores, with garbage bins and hand washing mechanisms 
placed within near vicinity.   Evidence of bottle recycling popularity can be witnessed when 
one stops to notice that these garbage bins in Norway are often filled with plastic bags that 
bottle recyclers have used to transport their bottles in (these plastic bags tend to leave 
olfactory remnants of beer or soda pop spillage) .  Thus we see that plastic bags act as an 
important transport technology that the plastic bottle recycling industry depends at least partly 
on.   
100 Dugnad is a custom in Norway in which local neighborhoods, schools, clubs, and organizations rely on joint 
voluntary work as a way of providing services required by the group.  For example: painting playgrounds, 
refereeing sports events, cleaning curbsides.  
101 SFT (2008), p.13. 
102 Ibid. 
103 SFT (2008), p.2. 
104 SFT (2008), p.10. 
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Industrial and household waste bins: as garbage liners 60 % 
Industrial and household waste bins: as waste  3 % 
Waste bins placed beside bottle deposit-refund machines 18 % 
Plastic recycling locations 15 % 
Near glass and metal recycling locations 3 % 
Near clothes collection and recycling locations 1 % 
Total landfill plastic bags 100 % 
 
Table 5.1. Sources of plastic bags that ultimately end up in Norwegian landfills.  Source (SFT (2008), p.10) 
 
In addition, we can see that Norwegians use plastic bags to recycle a host of other materials: 
glass, metal, and clothes.  It should be noted that the effectiveness of these reuse and 
recycling programs could plausibly be compromised if Norwegian authorities were to follow 
other countries in implementing prohibitive plastic bag policies.  
Plastic bag prohibitions, both performance based as well as technology based CAC strategies, 
would probably be inefficient if implemented in Norway.  In Chapter 4 it was shown that 
implementation of prohibition strategies are less justified in societies that are not prone to 
human catastrophe via plastic bag littering. Norway is a country with an economy that more 
resembles the economy exposited in Figure 4.1, as opposed to the economy in Figure 4.2, 
because it does not seem to be prone to major floods, malaria infestation, or any other human 
catastrophe via plastic bag littering.  This means that a full prohibition on plastic bags would 
probably be too stringent if applied in Norway.  This result is exacerbated when we take into 
account the high benefit levels that Norwegians seem to extract from plastic bag consumption.  
In addition, it would seem that a partial prohibition on the thinner HDPE plastic bags would 
be less effective in Norway than many other jurisdictions due to the low fraction of HDPE 
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plastic bags in the Norwegian marketplace - the more robust LDPE plastic bags capture a 
dominant 90% of the Norwegian market105
It should be noted that information regarding the effects of plastic bag use in Norway on 
biodiversity loss are undocumented.  Norway signaled its interest in preserving biodiversity 
when they ratified the Convention on Biodiversity in 1993
.   
106.  In Norway, it is estimated that 
at least 130 plant and animal species have gone extinct in the last 150 years107
Chapter 2 was used to analyze worldwide plastic bag policy implementations.  We saw there 
that the littering problem is so high in other countries so as to warrant plastic bag regulations.  
Norway, on the other hand, does not have any discernable plastic bag littering problem.  This 
is a puzzle that can be reconciled by the economic theory exposited in this thesis, as follows. 
.  Whether or 
not any of these were a result of plastic bags littering is questionable due to the 
aforementioned underdocumentation.  In Chapter 3 biodiversity loss as a potential externality 
was discussed.  If evidence were to point towards plastic bag littering as being a cause of 
biodiversity loss in Norway, then Norwegian policy-makers must take that information into 
account when determining the optimal welfare level of plastic bag littering. 
One explanation might be that strong moral motives already exist within the Norwegian 
marketplace, moral motives that effectively function to restrain the littering level.  If we go 
back to figure 4.1, we can imagine the moral norm being strong enough such that the 
economy’s location on the dynamic development curve initially fell to the right of the 
unstable tipping point, 𝑎′, which would have made the economy move to the stable 
equilibrium at 𝑎 = 1.  If this is the case then a consumer tax would be redundant because 
Norwegians already find themselves in a low litter or litter free environment.  The plausibility 
of this explanation is strengthened when we consider a survey conducted by Bruvoll et al 
                                                 
105 Ministry of the Environment (2001), p.8. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
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(2002) that points towards a high level of moral internalization in Norway.  That particular 
survey found that up to 73% of Norwegians that recycled their household waste agreed that 
one of the reasons they recycled was because “I wish to think of myself as a responsible 
individual” and that 88% of Norwegians that recycled their household waste agreed that one 
of the reasons they recycled was because “I should do myself what I want others to do”. 
Another explanation might be because monetary incentives have already been altered by 
relative price increases set forth via commercial retailer charges on plastic bags in Norway.  
Commercial grocers such as ICA, Rema 1000, Rimi, and Bunnpris all charge a token payment, 
typically approximately 1 NOK per bag.  As we saw in Chapter 4, if this commercial charge 
alters consumer beliefs about the fraction of non-litterers such that the interpretation goes 
from the left to the right of  𝑎′ in Figure 4.1, then that charge can in fact cause the non-
littering option to become the perceived morally correct action.  On the face of it, it would 
seem that a commercial charge would be less effective when compared to a government 
charge.  It could be argued that a government tax would appear less profit-oriented and thus 
have stronger signalling power than a commercial charge and therefore more effectively 
change consumers’ idea of the morally ideal contribution.  This would certainly be the case if 
we make the assumption that government taxes are backed by educational campaigns 
enlightening consumers about the morally ideal contribution whereas commercial charges are 
not.  But nonetheless, commercial charges could still explain why moral norms became 
internalized in Norway – because the commercial plastic bag charge altered the consumer 
payoff structure by making it individually less profitable for individuals to litter plastic bags. 
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6 Conclusion  
The world has witnessed a recent proliferation of plastic bag regulation policies.  Most of 
these policies are implemented to curb perceived littering problems.  The littering problem in 
the plastic bag case is a negative consumption externality that can have deleterious impacts on 
public good commodities such as aesthetics, biodiversity, and protection from human 
catastrophe.  The environmental dilemma associated with the littering problem closely 
parallels that of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  This is a concern because, given economic 
actors of the Homo Oeconomicus type, a free riding problem can ensue and ultimately lead to 
inefficiency.  In a model depicting a large population, a 100% litter free society would never 
exist.   
The policies implemented to date are either command and control instruments such as 
complete or partial prohibitions or market based instruments such as consumer or producer 
taxes.  Whether or not any of these instruments are economically justified depends on the 
nature of the jurisdiction’s marginal benefits and marginal cost functions.  Typically plastic 
bag prohibitions are inefficient.  But economies do exist in which prohibitions may be 
justified.   
A market that finds itself at an inefficient equilibrium can theoretically be corrected by 
implementing a first-best Pigou tax. However, only a second-best tax is possible in the plastic 
bag case because a consumer tax on the product itself is feasible whereas a tax on the littering 
activity is infeasible.  The justification for a second-best tax implemented in the form of a 
plastic bag consumption tax is strengthened if consumers have moral preferences.  If we 
amend the Homo Oeconomicus model to account for moral preferences, norms might be 
internalized so as to achieve a collectively better result.  Government policy initiatives might 
be able to incentivize consumers to behave towards their perceived morally ideal way based 
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on socially contingent moral motivation.  The consumer tax could best propagate a non-
littering environment if aided by an educational campaign that creates stimulus response 
compatibility. 
At this point in time, Norway has chosen not to implement plastic bag regulations.  Norway 
does not seem to have a littering problem.  This means that the potential negative externalities 
arising via plastic bag littering are of little relevance to Norway.  A full prohibition in Norway 
would probably be inefficient because Norwegians seem to derive relatively high benefit 
levels from the plastic bag consumption process and they don’t seem predisposed to human 
catastrophe via plastic bag littering. Effects of a partial prohibition on thin HDPE bags would 
presumably be marginal because the thicker LDPE bags dominate the Norwegian 
marketplace.  Economic theory can help suggest why discrepancies exist between 
jurisdictions with significant littering problems and jurisdictions, like Norway, with 
insignificant littering problems.  One such explanation, supported by empirical evidence, 
suggests that Norway is a country with strong moral motives already in place, moral motives 
that effectively function to restrain the littering level.  Another explanation might be that 
monetary incentives to not litter have already been provided by relative price increases set 
forth via commercial retailer charges on plastic bags in Norway.   
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